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Abstract—Protocol reverse engineering based on traffic traces
infers the behavior of unknown network protocols by analyzing
observable network messages. To perform correct deduction
of message semantics or behavior analysis, accurate message
type identification is an essential first step. However, identifying
message types is particularly difficult for binary protocols, whose
structural features are hidden in their densely packed data repre-
sentation. We leverage the intrinsic structural features of binary
protocols and propose an accurate method for discriminating
message types.
Our approach uses a similarity measure with continuous
value range by comparing feature vectors where vector elements
correspond to the fields in a message, rather than discrete
byte values. This enables a better recognition of structural
patterns, which remain hidden when only exact value matches
are considered. We combine Hirschberg alignment with DBSCAN
as cluster algorithm to yield a novel inference mechanism. By
applying novel autoconfiguration schemes, we do not require
manually configured parameters for the analysis of an unknown
protocol, as required by earlier approaches.
Results of our evaluations show that our approach has con-
siderable advantages in message type identification result quality
and also execution performance over previous approaches.
Index Terms—network reconnaissance; protocol reverse engi-
neering; vulnerability research
I. INTRODUCTION
Several recent surveys by Narayan et al. [1], Duchêne et al.
[2], and Kleber et al. [3] describe the current state of the art
for protocol reverse engineering based on network traffic traces
or programs. In this paper, we focus on traffic analysis based
on information gained by observing only the communication
link. Such traffic analysis is non-invasive and does not require
access to programs or control over any entity and therefore
is regularly applied [4]. This method of network analysis
has been used to gain comprehension of hitherto unknown
network protocol, e. g., NetBios services [5], the Koobface
command-and-control protocol [6], OSCAR [7], and IoT pro-
tocols [8]. The knowledge gained was then used for network
analysis and security-relevant tasks, like vulnerability testing
by fuzzing [7], the setup of honeypots [5], [6], analyzing
botnets [6], and automated network modeling [8].
Protocol reverse engineering based on network traffic traces
can roughly be divided into four steps, as shown in Fig. 1.
First, the protocol traffic is recorded into traces during pre-
processing. The second step is a structural analysis, whose
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Fig. 1: Steps of network traffic trace analysis.
purpose is to derive formats (e. g., data fields) of individual
messages exchanged within the protocol. After analyzing the
internal structure of messages, one important step is grouping
these messages into message types (for DHCP, e. g., Discover,
Offer, ACK). This information can then be used to derive a
state machine that describes the grammar of the protocol. We
place the derivation of the state machine out of the scope of our
work, since adequate methods already exist for this analysis
step [6], [9]–[11] that can be combined with our work. In this
paper, we propose a novel approach to automate the task of
message type identification for binary protocols.
As the mentioned surveys show, current methods for traffic
analysis mainly focus on textual protocols, which use separa-
tors and keywords that are discernible by natural language
processing (NLP). Most binary network protocols, which
represent data in concise bit patterns, lack these structural
features required for NLP. Most of the few known methods
tailored for binary protocols are derived from bio-informatics
algorithms, e. g., Needleman-Wunsch [12]. When analyzing
network protocols by these algorithms, messages commonly
are interpreted as sequences of bytes. To work around the
exponential complexity of naïve multiple sequence align-
ment [13], known applications for message analysis use the
agglomerative clustering of UPGMA [14]. The algorithm
recursively agglomerates, i. e. merges, similar pairs of clusters.
This process builds a phylogenetic guide-tree with a complex-
ity of the square of the amount of sequences [13].
In the bio-informatics use case, a phylogenetic tree is
favorable, since it reflects the evolution of genome sequences.
For protocol messages, no evolutionary relations exist, thus
the computational overhead of agglomerative clustering is un-
necessary. Moreover, aligning individual byte values detaches
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Fig. 2: Sequence of steps of NEMETYL and its intermediate results.
them from their context. This loss of context is undesirable
since the exact same value cannot be unconditionally expected
in multiple independent messages of binary protocols; this may
lead to spurious relationships of values across messages.
In contrast, our segment-based approach is designed to
provide better efficiency while improving the result quality
at the same time. To accomplish this, instead of aligning
byte-by-byte, we first split messages into segments using
computationally cheap heuristics, like cutting them into fixed
length chunks or applying a more advanced approach called
NEMESYS [15]. Based on domain knowledge about the
characteristics of typical network messages, we then derive
message types from these segmented messages. Since we
deal with unknown protocols, structure and data values are
obscured. Thus, like previous approaches, we must rely on
general domain knowledge about network protocols. We ob-
tained this knowledge from analyzing numerous binary pro-
tocols in order to ensure our approach’s general applicability.
From this knowledge, we derive assumptions that allow us to
design heuristic methods on which our approach relies. These
heuristics do not rely on phylogenetic relations, enabling us
to use a more efficient clustering algorithm.
The main contribution of our paper is a novel message type
identification approach for unknown binary protocols. Unlike
previous methods, our approach is designed to provide higher
accuracy without manual parameter selection. To achieve this
goal, we developed solutions to task-specific but fundamental
challenges in the handling of sequential binary data. These
contributions are the interpretation of binary data as feature
vectors, a novel way to apply a vector distance to unequally-
sized feature vectors, the application of Hirschberg alignment
and the DBSCAN cluster algorithm to the area of protocol
reverse engineering, and a novel method for auto-configuring
the DBSCAN parameter ǫ. We implement and evaluate our
approach in NEMETYL: NEtwork MEssage TYpe identifi-
cation by aLignment on similarity between message segment
feature vectors. To evaluate NEMETYL we use known real-
world binary protocols as a baseline. We determine the in-
ference quality in terms of well-known cluster properties and
compare them to the byte-wise sequence-alignment message
inference performed by the state-of-the-art tool Netzob1 [10].
In the next section, we discuss related work. In Sec. III, we
present the details of our approach followed by a description of
design decisions for its implementation NEMETYL in Sec. IV.
Sec. V contains the results of our evaluation of NEMETYL.
1github.com/netzob/netzob. All URLs last accessed on 18 Dec 2019.
Finally, we outline our ideas for future work and conclude the
paper in Sections VI and VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Static traffic analysis is a specific kind of protocol reverse
engineering, where network traffic between two genuine enti-
ties is monitored purely passively, e.g., without injecting own
messages or filtering some. The use of sequence alignment
to perform such an analysis was first suggested by Beddoe
[16]. Since Beddoe’s paper, a variety of algorithms from
natural language processing and bio-informatics have been
applied to network protocols [3]. There are also practical
implementations to perform static traffic analysis, the most
versatile of which is Netzob [10].
ScriptGen [5], Discoverer [17], and Netzob all use sequence
alignment to infer message types. ScriptGen and Discoverer
differ from Netzob in that they align subsequences of messages
(tokens or segments) instead of single bytes. They propose
effective methods to identify such tokens in textual protocols.
In addition, ScriptGen proposes the derivation of tokens from
frequency, variance, and other byte characteristics throughout
all messages of a trace. Although ScriptGen and Discoverer
claim their methods to be universally applicable, they leave
it to future work to solve the details of analyzing binary
protocols. All presented methods are using agglomerative
clustering by UPGMA [14], which prohibits the analysis of
large traces and ignores byte-contexts as discussed in the
introduction.
FieldHunter [18] combines concepts from Netzob, Dis-
coverer, ScriptGen, and other related methods. It provides
solutions for a number of challenges for format inference,
like characterization of field types. However, FieldHunter is
still based on byte-value features and thus also misses details
related to message structure.
In related work, the coverage of the analysis of binary
protocols is sparse and the robustness of existing solutions
is limited due to the kind of byte-wise analyses they per-
form. Furthermore, the common combination of agglomerative
clustering with conventional sequence alignment prohibits the
analysis of large traces due to the high computational demand.
III. APPROACH
Our approach, NEMETYL, consists of the steps illustrated
in Fig. 2. These steps are described in the following subsec-
tions. Among others, we require a suitable definition of sim-
ilarity between segments (message subsequences) as well as
between messages (message structure) and then use clustering
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to identify messages with a similar structure. Finally, we refine
these clustered message types to take into account differences
between types that have the same structure.
A. Message Segmentation
As a prerequisite, NEMETYL relies on a segmentation
of each message into atomic chunks of consecutive bytes.
Ideally, such segments correspond to protocol fields, but for
NEMETYL an approximate match of segments with field
boundaries suffices. Thus, any heuristic method to obtain
segments from messages may be applicable. In our current
work, we investigate three different segmenters:
tshark generates segments from true fields determined by
tshark’s dissectors. This qualifies as ground truth for field
boundaries of messages from already known protocols.
4-bytes-fixed uses fixed chunks of 4 byte length as segments.
With no additional information available about a protocol
to analyze, this is an extremely simple and efficient
fallback that is always available.
NEMESYS is a message segmenter we proposed previ-
ously [15]. This heuristic and computationally cheap
method approximates field boundaries for any unknown
network protocol by information-theoretical metrics.
B. Dissimilarity between Segments
To quantify dissimilarity between segments, we first need a
representation that describes the contents of each segment.
1) Extracting Feature Vectors from Message Segment Bytes:
We generate feature vectors from each segment’s byte values,
use hexadecimal notation for bytes, e. g., b = 0xA4, and write
a segment s as an ordered set of n byte values b0, . . . , bn−1:
s = 〈bi〉,with i ∈ [0, n− 1]
We interpret the sequence of byte values 〈bi〉 of a seg-
ment as a feature vector s, where the ith vector compo-
nent si = bi. For example, given a segment s = 〈bi〉 =
〈0x17, 0x23, 0x00, 0x42〉, the feature vector is writ-
ten as s = (0x17,0x23,0x00,0x42)T .
2) Canberra Dissimilarity: We use the Canberra distance
[19] to quantify the dissimilarity between segments, which for
vectors u and v of equal dimension n, is defined as:
dC(u, v) =
n−1∑
i=0
|ui − vi|
|ui|+ |vi|
, (1)
The Canberra distance correlates well with the intuitive sim-
ilarity of byte sequences in that it relates different values
in sequences to their common mean of values. However,
our application as a measure of dissimilarity requires to
extend this distance to be applicable to vectors of differing
dimensionality; otherwise segments of unequal length would
not be comparable. To accomplish this, we generalize the
notion of the Canberra distance to vectors of different length
by choosing an embedding of the higher-dimensional vector
into the lower-dimensional space. We normalize the distances
from the embedded vectors to assure comparability across
vector spaces. Note that this generalization is only valid for our
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Fig. 3: Sliding window interpretation of linear subspaces.
specific application in which the vector represents a segment,
as it violates the triangle inequality, and therefore constitutes
not a distance anymore, but instead a dissimilarity. We call
this the Canberra dissimilarity dm.
Without loss of generality, let s and t be segments with
|s| ≤ |t| and generate the associated vectors s → s, t → t.
The lengths of the segments imply the dimensionality of the
associated vectors: |s| = dim s and |t| = dim t. For the case
where |s| = |t|, we define dm(s, t) =
dC(s,t)
|s| . For the case
where |s| < |t|, we apply the following procedure to derive
the Canberra dissimilarity.
First, using a sliding window approach, we derive a series
of possible embeddings of the longer feature vector t into the
vector space of the shorter feature vector. The intuition behind
this is illustrated in Fig. 3. This shortened vector t′ can then
be compared using the standard Canberra distance, dC(t′, s).
The sliding window of length |s| = dim s can be represented
using an offset o as t[o,o+|s|]. Using this notation, the set of
suitable embeddings is defined as:
T = ∪
|t|−|s|
o=0 {t[o,o+|s|]} (2)
Second, we define the minimum Canberra dissimilarity dβ
between a set of vectors T as defined above and a shorter
candidate vector s as follows:
dβ(T, s) =
minT ({dC(t[o,o+|s|])})
|s|
(3)
This selects the lowest Canberra distance as a dissimilarity
between the longer and the shorter segment. Essentially, we
derive the nearest candidate vector (in terms of dC ). We then
normalize dβ to |s| in accordance with the explanation above.
Third, we note that for use as a dissimilarity, the pure dβ
provides undesirable results, since the difference in segment
length is completely ignored. Without the loss of generality,
we therefore extend our previously defined dissimilarity dm
with a non-linear modification based on the relative length of
the segments. Thus, we redefine2 dm as follows:
dm(s, t) =
|s|
|t|
dβ(s, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
subterm 1
+ r︸︷︷︸
subterm 2
+(1− dβ(s, t))r(
|s|
|t|2
− pf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
subterm 3
(4)
with r = |t|−|s||t| representing the length difference between
the segments, and with a parameter pf to set the non-linear
penalty in subterm 3, as discussed below.
2Our previous definition of dm still is valid as defined before, since
dβ(s, t) =
dC(s,t)
|s|
and r = 0 for |s| = |t|.
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The first subterm normalizes the minimum Canberra dissim-
ilarity dβ such that the longer segment’s length |t| becomes
the reference. This represents the immediate dissimilarity
between the selected components of the longer vector and
all components of the shorter one. As the dimensionality
difference increases, more information is discarded from t in
the computation of dβ . In Table I, example 1 illustrates that
dβ erroneously assigns a distance of zero if the shorter vector
is contained in the larger vector. To correct for this, we use
the second subterm, a linear factor r. Example 2 in Table I
illustrates that dm attests two vectors with a small dβ to have a
dissimilarity just below their relative dimensionality difference
( 12 ). Example 3 shows how this influences longer segment
pairs that have the same relative dimensionality differences.
Finally, if a longer absolute part of t is used to calculate dm,
this should result in a lower dissimilarity of the segments,
since we need to make less assumptions about the missing
vector components. For example, if 4 out of 5 components are
selected by dβ , the final dissimilarity dm should be higher than
if 16 of 20 components are known, even though the fraction is
the same. Intuitively, it is more unlikely that 16 components
mismatch for any two similar segments than 4. This absolute
difference between the vectors’ dimensionalities is taken into
account by the third subterm, which non-linearly increases to
penalize larger absolute dimensionality differences. The factor
pf parameterizes the steepness of the slope in the penalty
increase relative to dβ .
Each of the subterms describes a disjoined aspect of dis-
similarity between two segments and we can, thus, connect
them by simple summation. The subterms representing these
aspects sum up to a value of 1 for two maximally different
segments. dm decreases for more similar segments and reaches
0 for identical ones.
3) Refining Dissimilarities of Char Sequences: Segments
consisting of sequences of characters are special in a way
that make the raw Canberra dissimilarity values between
vectors for char sequences unsuitable. We therefore reduce
the dissimilarity values of pairs of segments that both are
chars by a factor of 0.5 to reflect the characteristics of char
sequences. We explain our heuristic to identify char sequences
in the implementation description (Sec. IV-B).
C. Similarity of Messages
In this step, we analyze the structural similarity of mes-
sages using the Needleman-Wunsch (NW) algorithm, which is
widely used for this purpose in protocol reverse engineering.
The algorithm finds the optimal alignment of two strings
TABLE I: Examples demonstrating the differences between
minimum Canberra dissimilarity and Canberra dissimilarity.
Example 1 2 3 4
t 0x0008 0x0208 0x5706906e 0x0208
t[o,|s|] 0x00 0x08 0x5706 0x0208
s 0x00 0x07 0x2700 0x0008
dβ 0.000 0.067 0.690 dm (|s| = |t|)
dm 0.460 0.496 0.814 0.5
using a substitution matrix N of possible alignments and the
associated alignment score. The maximum of these scores is
the most suitable alignment. The score is computed based on
a gap penalty pg and a similarity matrix S that expresses the
similarity of segments. The gap penalty is used to penalize
gaps (i. e., empty segments added to one of the messages)
in the alignment. The similarity between segments expresses
whether they accurately align. Most authors [5], [10], [16],
[17] simplify the algorithm by choosing a similarity matrix
such that the diagonal contains a match value pm and all other
values are pd. This makes alignment a boolean decision, which
is a major drawback of existing alignment methods [16], as
similar but unequal positions cannot be quantified appropri-
ately. In this section, we describe how the segment similarity
of the previous section can be used to improve the alignment of
NW. We then use the NW score to define message similarity,
from which we derive a message dissimilarity dNW that we
use in the next step of NEMETYL.
As an example, we use the two messages m0 =
0x0208000807 andm1 = 0x07270000082317. First, we
need to derive the similarity matrix S required for NW. This is
done by computing the pairwise similarity as 1−dm, where dm
is the dissimilarity measure from the previous step. Without
loss of generality, we define that pd is the minimum similarity
(zero) and pm is the maximum similarity (one). Intuitively, the
pairwise similarity represents a spectrum of similarity, rather
than the binary decision made by previous work. For this
example, this results in the following symmetric matrix:
S 07 2700 2317 0208 0008
07 1.00 0.16 0.25 0.50 0.50
2700 0.16 1.00 0.47 0.05 0.00
2317 0.25 0.47 1.00 0.31 0.26
0208 0.50 0.05 0.31 1.00 0.50
0008 0.50 0.00 0.26 0.50 1.00
We use this matrix together with a gap penalty pg = −1
to align the messages using NW. This algorithm computes
a substitution matrix N based on S and pg , which for this
example is:
N 0208 0008 07
0 −1 −2 −3
07 −1 0.50 −0.50 −1.00
2700 −2 −0.50 0.50 −0.33
0008 −3 −1.50 −0.50 1.01
2317 −4 −2.50 −0.50 0.76
The NW score N[i,j] in the substitution matrix is the degree
of congruence of a specific pair of segments, namely the i−1th
segment of m0 (columns) and the j−1th of m1 (rows). Since
the NW algorithm starts with blank strings, the dimensions of
the matrix N are |m0|s+1 columns and |m1|s+1 rows, where
|·|s refers to the number of segments with the matrix’ indexing
starting from 0. This matrix allows us to define the message
similarity based on the NW score. We follow Smith et al. [20],
and define the NW score N(m0,m1) as the bottom-right entry
in the substitution matrix N, i.e., N(m0,m1) = N|m0|s,|m1|s .
The self-similarity of each message is the amount of segments,
since in that case, each segment has a similarity of 1. The
message similarity can thus be described as follows:
4
m0 m1
m0 4 0.76
m1 0.76 3
NW scores quantify the similarity of messages through a
value in R. However, our goal is to find groups of messages
that are similar, for which an everywhere-positive dissimilarity
function is required. We thus define a function dNW : M ×
M → R+ based on the message similarity derived from the
NW score N(m0,m1):
dNW(m0,m1) = 1−
N(m0,m1)− tmin(m0,m1)
tmax(m0,m1)− tmin(m0,m1)
(5)
with tmin(m0,m1) = min(|m0|s, |m1|s) ·min(pg, pm, pd) and
tmax(m0,m1) = min(|m0|s, |m1|s) ·max(pg, pm, pd). Recall
pm and pd are bounds on segment similarity. Therefore, this
equation essentially normalizes the NW scores to a similarity
value, which is then subtracted from 1 to gain a dissimilarity.
By the end of this step, we have generated a message
dissimilarity matrix that contains an entry for the dissimilarity
between each pair of messages.
D. Clustering of Message Types
The message dissimilarity matrix from the previous step can
directly be used as input to cluster messages into types. The
challenge is to automatically configure the parameters of the
cluster method in a suitable way. Our approach aims for a
method that requires no a-priori knowledge of the protocol.
We identified DBSCAN [21] to be suitable for this task. It is
a density-based method and therefore makes no assumptions
about the shape of clusters. DBSCAN requires no target
number of clusters as parameter and deals with noise by rather
not assigning a sample to any cluster than choosing the wrong
one. Applying clustering without prior knowledge about the
trace requires to automatically derive the necessary parameters
for DBSCAN from the trace itself.
DBSCAN has two parameters, min_samples and ǫ, which
are auto-configurable since they can be derived from statistical
properties of the trace with a high rate of success. The
first, min_samples, determines the smallest valid cluster (see
Sec. IV-D). The second parameter, ǫ, defines a range around a
density core of samples that should constitute a cluster. This
parameter is specific to the data being clustered; in our case,
it depends on the characteristics of a trace. If ǫ is too large,
random noise will be placed in clusters, while if ǫ is too small,
meaningful clusters with only few samples will be considered
noise. As suitable values differ per trace, we developed an
auto-configuration technique for this parameter. Our choice
for ǫ is based on the distance to the kth nearest neighbor,
measured by NW-score dissimilarity dNW between messages.
The intuition is that as this function typically shows a sudden
change for a message set with well-defined clusters, the choice
for ǫ should be exactly at this point. The best choice for ǫ for
the set of messages M in a trace thus depends on k, which is
configured in the following.
We first define a family of functions fk : M → R of
which the kth function maps each message to the NW-score
dissimilarity of the kth nearest neighbor of that message. We
refer to this as the kth nearest neighbor distance function,
which quantifies how sparse a potential cluster of size k is.
More formally,
fk(m) = max(D ⊂ {dNW(m,mk) : mk ∈M}, (6)
|D| = k, s.t.
∑
a∈D
a is minimal)
We then apply a Gaussian filter (with parameter σ, see IV-D)
and determine the inputs (k,m) such that the curvature of
the k nearest neighbor distance function is maximal. This
process is biased towards large k, which we compensate for
by dividing through the value of the function, more formally:
argmax
(k,m)
G(f ′′k (m))
G(fk(m))
(7)
As fk is a family of discrete functions, curvature is here
defined using the forward difference, i. e., f ′′k (x) = f
′
k(x +
1) − f ′k(x) and f
′
k(x) = fk(x + 1) − fk(x). In other words,
we find the mǫ and function fkǫ for which the largest change
in curvature is observed. We then set ǫ to the value of the
chosen function at the chosen message, i. e., ǫ = fkǫ(mǫ).
Finally, we cluster messages into types by DBSCAN using
the auto-configured epsilon and the message dissimilarity
matrix of all dNW(mi,mj) as input. This step yields highly
precise clusters of messages classified into message types.
E. Message Alignment per Cluster
To determine the common internal structure for each mes-
sage type, we align the messages within each cluster to the
cluster’s medoid, i. e., the message with the lowest dissimilar-
ities to all other messages within the cluster.
This step results in clusters that each are commonly aligned
on the segments of their messages. Each common position in
the alignment of all segments we call a “field candidate”.
F. Cluster Refinement
The steps up to this point – segmentation, calculation of
segment dissimilarity and message similarity, clustering, and
alignment – establish the structural similarities of messages
and classify them accordingly. Different message types that are
structurally identical but distinguished only by dedicated field
values, e. g., message type A is denoted by value 0x01 and
type B by value 0x02 in field 1, cannot be discriminated by
this process alone. Therefore, we refine the clustering output
by applying additional heuristics to find such cases, splitting
underspecific clusters and merging overspecific clusters, to find
the message types more accurately. We discuss the details of
these heuristics in Sec. IV-F.
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1) Splitting Underspecific Clusters: To identify dedicated
field values that distinguish structurally identical message
types, we search for fields in the aligned clusters that contain
only few distinct values. These fields are likely to denote
individual message types within one cluster and we therefore
split it into sub-clusters that each contain only messages
having one of the distinct values in this specific field.
2) Merging Overspecific Clusters: For some structurally
complex protocol messages, multiple clusters exist for a single
message type. We merge these overspecific clusters of sim-
ilarly structured messages into one. Thus, the alignment of
each cluster is generalized into dynamic, static value (e. g.,
0100), and GAP field candidates. Two clusters that exhibit a
compatible structure according to the generalized alignment
of the clusters are merged. An example of the aligned field
candidates for a mergeable pair of clusters looks like:
DYNAMIC 0100 0001 DYNAMIC DYNAMIC 0001
DYNAMIC 0100 GAP 00 001c 0001
The final result of our approach are clusters of messages
with similar structure that have an increased accuracy com-
pared to the result of the raw clustering.
IV. NEMETYL IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a modular proof of concept of
NEMETYL to validate our approach. It uses numpy3, scipy4,
sklearn.cluster.DBSCAN5, netzob6, and NEMESYS7. This
section discusses parameter choices and design decisions made
as part of the implementation and also highlights some more
details on the general process.
A. Message Segmentation
We investigate three different segmentation approaches:
tshark, 4-bytes-fixed, and NEMESYS. The tshark approach
uses the true field boundaries and is thus not available for
unknown protocols but serves as a baseline for perfect segment
knowledge. 4-bytes-fixed ignores real field boundaries and uses
4-byte chunks as segments.
Finally, NEMESYS approximates the true field boundaries
without knowledge of the true structure. NEMESYS compares
subsequent bytes with a method called “Gaussian-filtered Bit
Congruence deltas”. Throughout an individual message, this
method reveals value patterns that it exploits to derive probable
field boundaries. In order to apply NEMESYS in NEMETYL,
we needed to make three small modifications to the original
scheme. First, we additionally perform a frequency analysis
of the most common segment values. If one of these most
frequent values is a subsequence of another, larger segment,
we split this larger segment to reveal the more frequent and
3www.numpy.org, version 1.13.3
4www.scipy.org, version 1.0.0
5scikit-learn.org/0.19/modules/generated/sklearn.cluster.DBSCAN.html
6github.com/netzob/netzob/tree/next, “next” branch
7github.com/vs-uulm/nemesys
therefore more probable segment boundary. Second, we en-
hance NEMESYS by our char sequence detection to improve
the recognition of sequences of textual parts within the binary
protocol. Third, NEMESYS has issues with the initial segment
of each message. Therefore, we split each message’s first
segment into dedicated, one-byte segments. Due to its heuristic
nature, NEMESYS leads to less distinct message-type cluster
borders than the tshark segmenter. To compensate, we reduce
the allowed range around density-cores for the DBSCAN-
based clustering relative to the automatically determined value:
Therefore when using NEMESYS, we adjust ǫ by an additional
factor of 0.8.
B. Dissimilarities between Segments
As explained, we need to treat char sequences in a special
way. However, since our approach is intended for the analysis
of unknown protocols, we have no definitive knowledge about
where to expect char sequences. We empirically determined
characteristics of char sequences in 40 000 messages of the
protocols DNS, NBNS, SMB, and DHCP from real-world
traces. Thereby, we selected optimal values for a number of
parameters that describe these characteristics to achieve a low
number of false positives in the char detection. Based on this
analysis, we detect hypothetical char segments if all of the
following conditions are true:
• All bytes have values lower than 0x7f; (and)
• the sequence is at least 6 bytes long; (and)
• the mean of byte values is between the thresholds tl and
th. We exclude zero bytes from the mean calculation
to account for termination, padding, and latin chars in
UTF-16. Our analysis determined working values to be
(tl, th) = (50, 115); (and)
• the ratio of non-printable and non-zero chars in one
segment to the segment’s length is below 0.33.
We further validated the char detection by applying this
heuristic to NTP, which contains no chars, showing no false
positives.
C. Similarity of Messages
To compute NW scores, we use the Hirschberg alignment of
the segments in a message pair. Hirschberg alignment [22] is
a memory optimized version of Needleman-Wunsch [12]. Our
approach requires that a gap is only inserted in the alignment
if no similar segments are available at one position. Gaps
therefore are scored negative and the value for the alignment
parameter pg = −1 was iteratively determined in a pilot study.
D. Clustering of Message Types
To robustly handle noisy data for the auto-configuration of
DBSCAN’s ǫ parameter, we smooth the values of the discrete
message distance function by a Gaussian filter G(d(s0, sk)).
The filter’s single parameter is the standard deviation σ. A
pilot study showed that σ = ln(n) with n being the number
of neighbors removes noise sufficiently while retaining enough
detail in the distance function. We further limit the impact of
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noise in the dissimilarity values when selecting the distance
function fk(m) by two actions: First, we limit the iteration
of k to the closest 10% of k-nearest neighbors. Secondly, to
remove boundary effects for values of m close to the edges
of the discrete distance function fk(m), we limit the range of
m to 2σ < m < n− 2σ after applying the Gaussian filter.
Since we merge overspecific clusters in the final step, we
set DBSCAN’s min_samples parameter to the low value of 3.
E. Message Alignment per Cluster
For the actual alignment of messages within a cluster, we
reuse the fixed alignment parameters from Sec. IV-C. First, we
ascendingly sort the messages in a cluster by their dissimilarity
to the medoid. Then we iterate through this list and align the
next message to the common alignment of the medoid and all
messages aligned in the previous iteration. This constitutes a
progressive alignment of the previous messages with the next
one. In each iterative alignment we introduce new gaps in all
already aligned messages including the medoid.
F. Cluster Refinement
1) Splitting Underspecific Clusters: To discriminate mul-
tiple message types within one cluster of structurally similar
messages, we first need to determine which fields distinguish
the message type. As criterion, we use the observation that
distinct values are frequent within one field that distinguishes
the message type. As a heuristic, t = ⌊ln(|c|)⌋ is a threshold
for the cluster c to define a frequent value among |c| values.
A field then is distinguishing message types if it contains only
frequent values, determined by satisfying min(a) > t ≥ |a|
with a being the sorted set of value counts of the field. For
example, if the values of one field in cluster c are 5 times 85,
01 is contained 8 times, and 23 9 times, then a = {5, 8, 9},
min(a) = 5, |a| = 3, and |c| =
∑
a = 22. Therefore, t
is 3, and the inequality holds so that we consider this field
to contain only frequent values. Thus, we found a field that
likely distinguishes message types. All clusters will be split
so that fields with frequent values will be the only value in
the distinguishing field in a single cluster.
2) Merging Overspecific Clusters: To determine if align-
ments are similar enough to merge clusters, we abstract
the alignments: One sequence of abstracted field candidates
represents the collective structure of the messages in a cluster.
We align these abstracted message structures of each pair of
clusters by NW. Two clusters are merged if at least one of the
following is true for all aligned field candidates:
• A gap is present in either structure at one position.
• Both field candidates have the same static byte values or
both are dynamic.
• Either field candidate consists of only zero bytes.
• One field candidate is static, the other dynamic and con-
tains the static candidate’s value in at least one message.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate the quality of our message type identification
approach by examining binary protocol traces of DNS, NBNS,
NTP, SMB, and DHCP8 and analyzing the precision P and
recall R of identified message clusters, which are defined as:
P =
TP
TP+ FP
and R =
TP
TP+ FN
For multiple clusters, TP, FP, TN, and FN, constituting the
so called confusion matrix, are defined through the correct and
incorrect assignments of messages, as discussed by Manning
et al. [23]. Positives (_P) therefore are all pairs of messages
that are classified into the same cluster, while such a pair is
true (TP) if both messages are of the same type. Negatives
(_N) and false (F_) assignments are defined accordingly. The
amount of positives and negatives for n clusters ci are thus
given as:
TP+FP =
∑
i
(
|ci|
2
)
and TN+FN =
∑
i,j
(|ci| · |cj |) ,
where j = {0 . . . (n−1)}\i. The number of true positives and
false negatives (and, through the above equations, the complete
confusion matrix) are given by:
TP =
∑
i
∑
l
(
|ti,l|
2
)
and FN =
∑
i
∑
l
(|tl| − |ti,l|) · |ti,l|
2
,
where ti,l are the messages of type l in cluster i, while tl
denotes the messages of type l and thus tl = ∪i ti,l.
To obtain the required ground truth for testing our results
against, we implemented Python modules that obtain the true
field dissection of each message and compare these to the
inferred message types. As ground truth about the protocol
specification, we utilize tshark9. For each message in the trace,
we compare the inference results to the according protocol
dissector provided by tshark. As specimens, we use the binary
protocols DNS, NBNS, NTP, SMB, and DHCP. We chose
these protocols as representatives of different typical binary
protocols. DHCP and SMB have varying amounts and lengths
of fields. We chose NTP because it is a protocol of fixed field
lengths, where the lengths range from 1 to 8 bytes for the
different fields. DNS and NBNS contain mostly 2 byte binary
fields mixed with variable length fields of ASCII-encoded
characters. The traces we analyzed are publicly available10; we
pre-processed each raw trace by filtering for only the desired
protocol, removing duplicates of the payload, and truncating
them to 1 000 messages each.
8 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (RFC 2131), Domain Name System
(RFC 1035), NetBIOS Name Service (RFC 1002), Network Time Protocol
(RFC 958), and Server Message Block (Microsoft)
9Command line interface of Wireshark, see www.wireshark.org
10 NTP, NBNS, SMB, and DHCP filtered from
download.netresec.com/pcap/smia-2011/; DNS filtered from
ictf.cs.ucsb.edu/archive/2010/dumps/ictf2010pcap.tar.gz
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(a) Segmenting with tshark.
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(b) Fixed segments of 4 bytes.
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(c) Segments of NEMESYS.
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(d) Clustering quality of Netzob.
Fig. 4: Clustering quality results of NEMETYL using different segmenters and Netzob for comparison.
The protocols are • DHCP,  DNS, ⋆ NBNS,  NTP, and N SMB.
A. Test Cases for Clustering Quality
To show the validity of the assumptions that our approach is
based on and the impact of the selected segmenter providing
the field candidates, we run our implementation with different
segmenters that provide all messages of a trace segmented into
(1) the true fields from the dissector, (2) equal-length chunks of
4 bytes, and (3) the hypothetical fields inferred by NEMESYS.
B. Results
In this section, we present the results of applying
NEMETYL with the three described segmenters. Our approach
considers messages as noise if the clustering and refinement
cannot determine a reliable choice for a classification. The
amount of noise for each inference is given alongside with
the precision and recall. To set our results into context, we
use Netzob for inferring the same traces as we evaluate our
approach with. Netzob uses NW to byte-wise align all mes-
sages and identify message types from hierarchical clustering
using the scores for this alignment.
Netzob and the segmenter NEMESYS each require to set
a parameter. The parameter σ adjusts the Gaussian filter in
NEMESYS to the expected maximum lengths of fields in the
target protocol. We used the optimal values given in Kleber
et al. [15]. Netzob’s parameter is the similarity threshold
that needs to be reached for the hierarchical clustering to
terminate and thus directly adjusts the clusters. For Netzob, we
determined the optimal similarity thresholds for each protocol
in multiple test runs iterating the parameter. The selected
parameter values are given in Table II.
1) tshark Segments: Using true field borders as message
segments, the message types of all protocols could be deter-
mined with high accuracy as can be seen in Table II, tshark
column, and illustrated by Fig. 4a, with the exception of
DHCP, which has a complex structure that does not clearly
reflect the message type. This is noticeable by the low recall
value, which is due to structurally diverse message types
that are split up into multiple clusters. SMB’s relatively low
precision is due to one large cluster of structurally identical
messages which our splitting heuristic was not able to dis-
criminate further.
2) 4-bytes-fixed Segments: As to be expected, the use of
an uninformed segmentation to find field candidates yields
considerably worse results, as can be observed in Table II, 4-
bytes-fixed column, and is illustrated by Fig. 4b. For protocols
that determine their message type by single flag fields, in this
case NBNS, this causes low recall values. The simple field
structure of DNS and NTP is obscured by the fixed segment
splitting, leading to low precision values. However, especially
for the complex protocols DHCP and SMB the similarities of
the messages are sufficiently recovered by this simple method
to identify significant differences in message types.
3) NEMESYS Segmens: Finally, NEMESYS infers field
boundaries heuristically. In Table II, NEMESYS column, we
give the quality and the sigma values used for each protocol
to configure NEMESYS. We illustrate the results by Fig. 4c.
It can be noticed that DHCP and SMB have comparably low
recall results. This is due to the complexity of the protocol that
not always reflects message types by their structure. Like for
the tshark segmenter, more than one cluster is created for one
message type, although the other types are identified correctly.
The high correctness of the field boundaries determined by
NEMESYS for NBNS and NTP causes the excellent quality
of these protocols’ inference. NEMESYS even outperforms
tshark regarding NTP recall due to one large cluster that our
heuristic splitting severs falsely in the case of tshark.
4) Netzob Baseline: For comparison, we apply the infer-
ence of Netzob to the same protocol traces as our approach.
The resulting clusters’ precision and recall, as illustrated in
Fig. 4d, can be found in the last column of Table II, alongside
the similarity threshold used for each protocol.
Unsurprisingly, NEMETYL in conjunction with the ground
truth segmenter tshark clearly outperforms Netzob. In a more
realistic case where the message segmentation is unknown,
NEMETYL with the NEMESYS segmenter yields a lower
recall for SMB compared to Netzob and significantly outper-
forms Netzob for DHCP, DNS, NBNS, NTP, and SMB in
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TABLE II: Clustering quality of NEMETYL using different segmenters (columns two to four) and Netzob (column five).
Segmenter tshark 4-bytes-fixed NEMESYS Netzob method
precision recall noise precision recall noise precision recall noise σ precision recall threshold
DHCP 1.00 0.54 35 0.69 0.96 0 0.99 0.56 7 0.6 0.97 0.38 78
DNS 1.00 0.98 18 0.37 0.74 17 0.69 0.98 7 0.6 0.35 1.00 50
NBNS 1.00 0.99 21 1.00 0.13 21 1.00 0.98 13 0.9 0.97 0.69 58
NTP 1.00 0.79 6 0.34 0.96 2 1.00 0.95 27 1.2 0.99 0.69 57
SMB 0.81 0.88 8 0.55 0.76 16 0.85 0.74 65 1.2 0.42 0.95 55
terms of precision. In summary, NEMETYL in combination
with NEMESYS constitutes a relatively reliable method of
high-quality to identify unknown protocol’s message types that
exhibit structural differences.
C. Interpretation
What sets NEMETYL apart from previous methods of mes-
sage type identification is shown in the following interpretation
of the evaluation results.
(1) The high quality of applying our implementation to
dissector-generated true fields (Sec. V-B1) shows:
• Distinctive differences between field types exist and can
be exploited to derive similarity between messages.
• The feature (byte value vector) and dissimilarity measure
(based on Canberra) we employ works well in revealing
these differences.
• Our interpretation of mixed-dimension vectors reflects
real similarities between mixed-length segments.
• Our combination of alignment with a continuous, i. e.,
non-discrete, segment-similarity matrix for calculating
alignment-match scores constitutes a valid method.
(2) Applying our implementation to field-structure-agnostic
equal-length segments of messages (Sec. V-B2) shows:
• Our approach works to some extent even when no knowl-
edge about field boundaries is available.
• Having fixed-length segments allows for a simple and
efficient dissimilarity calculation providing quick results,
especially for complex protocols.
• The dissector-generated fields for the tshark and
NEMESYS segmenters required us to conceive a novel
method to calculate dissimilarities between mixed-length
segments. In contrast, using fixed lengths of segments
in this second stage of the evaluation allows us to
calculate distances by the well-known Canberra distance
within the constant vector space of four dimensions.
Comparing these alignment results to those of the tshark
and NEMESYS segmenters, which use our Canberra
dissimilarity, shows that Canberra dissimilarity provides
valid dissimilarity measurements and thereby backs the
validity of the mixed-length dissimilarity.
(3) Applying our implementation to NEMESYS-inferred
segments of messages that denote hypothetical fields
(Sec. V-B3) shows:
• The quality of the segmentation influences the alignment
and type identification.
• Non-trivial segmentation is possible without a-priori
knowledge about the protocol, in turn reinforcing the
results of our previous work NEMESYS.
• Thus, for a fully automated tool, NEMESYS and
NEMETYL are a feasible combination of methods.
D. Limitations
A general limitation of static traffic analysis is that it is
prevented by encryption of the messages. This can only be
overcome by obtaining a plain-text trace [2]. For example, a
Man-in-the-Middle between two genuine entities can record
the decrypted messages in transit [24]. This method requires
control over the network topology.
Depending on the protocol trace to be analyzed, in particular
complex message structures lead to overspecific clusters. Our
approach is focused on determining message types on struc-
tural similarities. Despite the cluster refinements we propose to
overcome this, a protocol that defines distinct but structurally
very similar message types can still lead to clusters of mixed
message types. In this case, clusters that contain messages of
multiple types mislead the cluster merging heuristic to merge
even more misclassified messages into one mixed cluster. In
our set of test traces this was the case for DHCP and SMB.
As we have shown, even in this case, NEMETYL is superior
to previous alignment-based approaches like Netzob.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Besides the three evaluated segmenters, other methods of
determining atomic chunks of network messages could be
devised. However, known methods that may be suited for
this task originate from natural language processing [25] and
require adaption to be applicable to binary protocols.
Another line of research is to confirm that our approach
can be applied to other protocols without significant parameter
tuning. To this end, we plan to validate the robustness of
NEMETYL with more known and unknown protocols.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel method of message type
identification for unknown network protocols.
NEMETYL aligns messages without relying on identical
byte values to determine the similarity of field candidates
or single bytes. With this method we are able to efficiently
identify message types of binary protocols. The novelty of
our approach is that we abstract from discrete byte values
to feature vectors that allow for a similarity measure with
a continuous value range. Thus, we are able to discover
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structural patterns, which remain hidden when only exact value
matches are considered. We use message segments, not bytes,
as atomic parts of a message, and apply sequence alignment
to it. We combine Hirschberg alignment with DBSCAN as
cluster algorithm to improve performance over agglomerative
clustering. This results in another benefit of the approach
of NEMETYL over previous approaches: It does not require
to select any parameter a-priori for the analysis of an un-
known protocol. We accomplish this by proposing methods to
automatically configure all employed algorithms, particularly
including DBSCAN clustering.
We evaluated our approach to validate different aspects of
our solution. To have enough information about the protocol
specifications of our test traces for deriving the reverse engi-
neering quality, we used known protocols for a quantitative
comparison. The results for three different segmentation al-
gorithms show that NEMETYL has considerable advantages
in message type identification result quality over previous
approaches. Since using a similarity measure with a continuous
value range for message parts and messages to analyze an
unknown protocol, our approach denotes a fundamentally new
method for analyzing binary protocols.
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